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Abstract 
Community management of forests by Van Panchayats (forest councils) to meet local needs has a 
long history in the Indian Central Himalayas. This essay examines the effects of village-level 
heterogeneity in caste and land ownership, and of female membership in the Panchayats on 
collective action for forest conservation. There is no evidence that caste heterogeneity or female 
membership of the Panchayat have any effect. There is some evidence that greater equality in land 
ownership may enhance collective action and forest conservation in pine forests but not 
broadleaved forests. This is puzzling since villagers’ interest in conservation is greater in 
broadleaved than in pine forests. 
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Introduction 
 
It is of interest to examine the role of heterogeneity in asset ownership and ethnicity in the 
success of community management of forests for at least two reasons. First, we would like to know 
under what conditions community management of forests (as compared to state management, for 
example), is likely to be successful in order to make policy appropriately. Secondly, this setting is 
interesting for examining some hypotheses about the role that heterogeneity plays in collective 
action in general. 
 
There are at least three different arguments that can be advanced for why heterogeneity may 
be inimical to the success of collective action. One, proposed by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 
(1999), suggests that tastes for public goods may differ across groups, and this can reduce the 
willingness to pay for public goods which may not be the kind that one’s own group wants. This 
argument does not really apply in the case of the Himalayan forests examined in this paper, where 
the benefit from collective action is forest preservation and its associated benefits so that there is 
really not much choice as to the type of public good to be financed.  
 
A second argument, often made by political scientists, is that social divisions may throw up 
politicians who seek to provide private benefits to particular groups rather than providing public 
goods. Again, in the setting of small village forests, this argument does not apply.  
 
This leaves a third argument, perhaps the simplest, which says that heterogeneity makes it 
harder for communities to reach an agreement about the sharing of benefits or costs of collective 
action. Inequality in power, for example, may mean that equal division would be unacceptable to 
the powerful, while any other distribution may be subject to conflict. The basis of this argument is 
that heterogeneity removes a natural focal point for agreements, and, simultaneously makes groups 
uncertain about other groups’ preferences, thus making agreement less likely as each group tries to 
drive a hard bargain, one that may be unacceptable to the other groups. The community forest 
setting provides an opportunity to test this last argument. 
 
This paper uses satellite data to measure forest density in Himalayan forests in northern 
India. The forests are managed by Van Panchayats, village councils created specifically to manage 
village forests. A village-level survey that was carried out as part of the research provides data on 
heterogeneity and other variables of interest.      




The study area lies in the Himalayas, in the Kumaun and Garhwal regions in the state of 
Uttaranchal in northern India. It ranges from 300 to over 3000 meters in altitude. Terraced 
agriculture, the principal occupation, absorbing 80% of the labor force, is found up to a height of 
about 1800 meters on the gentler slopes. Owing to the mountainous terrain and the limited 
possibilities for irrigation, agriculture is far less productive than in the plains. The value of 
agricultural production per hectare in the three districts into which the study area falls is little more 
than a half that for India. 
 
Forests are very important for agriculture, since they are the main source of manure. This 
comes directly as leaf mould from broadleaved, mainly oak, forests. The oak forests also indirectly 
support agriculture, being a source of fodder and grazing for cattle, whose dung is used for manure. 
Oak leaf fodder, in particular, is of importance since it is often the only source of green fodder in 
the winter months. (Himalayan oaks are evergreen, not deciduous). Timber from oaks has 
traditionally been used for making ploughs. 
 
In addition to the broadleaved forests, from elevations of 1000 to 1800 meters there are chir 
pine (Pinus roxburghii) forests. The villagers generally perceive these to be less useful since they 
are not believed to be as effective in preserving the water supply, and are useless for fodder, while 
pine needles are an inferior source of manure. Pine trees provide firewood, but their greatest use, for 
timber, is bound up in cumbersome regulation by the government, even in village Panchayat 
(council) forests.  
 
Despite the importance of the forests, widespread degradation has taken place, owing to the 
problem of the commons. Up until about the 1960's, oak forests were sometimes felled for making 
charcoal to be supplied to the hill towns and military bases. Following felling, grazing and lopping 
of the new growth by villagers often prevented effective regeneration and led to degradation into 
scrub.  
 
The institution that forms the principal locus of collective action to manage village forests is 
the Van Panchayat, literally, "forest council". About one-third of the villages in the region have 
Panchayat Forests. The rest use Reserved Forests, which are managed by the state government's 
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forest department, and Civil forests, which are unmanaged village commons. Civil forests are 
generally very degraded (Somanathan, Prabhakar, and Mehta, 2002). 
 
The government established the Van Panchayat system in 1930 as a means of arresting the 
degradation that was then taking place. It was meant to enable the villagers to form officially 
recognized councils with the powers to frame rules for use of the forests under their control. These 
were to be known as Panchayat forests. Villagers could apply to create Panchayat forests out of 
Reserved forests and those parts of their village forests that had not been reserved.  
 
Panchayat or Council members, are elected by a show of hands in front of a government 
official once every five years.
5
 There are usually 5 to 7 members of the Panchayat, whose chairman 
is called the Sarpanch. The Panchayat is empowered to make rules and regulations to restrict and 
manage harvesting for forest products, and to levy fines on violators. Nevertheless, it lacks the 
coercive authority of the state, in that if the accused refuses to pay the fine, the Panchayat’s only 
legal recourse is to approach the courts to recover the fine, a very costly procedure that is never 
resorted to. Instead, social pressure is applied to force the violator to pay. Another weakness of the 
system is that some Panchayats have no source of revenue other than voluntary contributions from 
villagers to pay for a watchman. Others may have revenue from the sale of contracts for resin-
tapping from pine trees or leases for stone quarries on Panchayat land. However, the Panchayats 
often have difficulty in getting access to the funds from the proceeds of such activities, as their bank 
accounts are in the control of a state government official. These weaknesses imply that the 
Panchayats are strongly dependent on informal collective action and social norms. 
 
Van Panchayats provide a favorable mechanism for overcoming the common pool problem 
in village forests, at least with respect to broadleaved species. The institution is the only one of its 
kind in India, in having permanent control over its forest, with legal recognition from the 
government. Villagers are far more secure in their tenure in comparison with the system of Joint 
Forest Management between the state forest departments and forest user groups which has spread 
widely in India in the 1990's. In fact, Van Panchayats probably compare favorably in terms of 
security of tenure and community control to most such institutions in developing countries. 
 
 
5On the functioning of Forest Panchayats, see Anon. (1984), Saxena (1987, 1995), Ballabh and 
Katar Singh (1988), Somanathan (1991), Aggarwal (1996), Agrawal and Yadama (1997), Raju 
(1997), and Satyajit Singh (1998), among others. 
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While agricultural productivity is low in the region, inequality is lower than in the rest of 
India.
6 The gini coefficient of landholdings (including landless agricultural households) is only 
about 0.3 for Almora and Pithoragarh districts into which most of our villages fall and is about 0.43 
for Chamoli in which the remaining villages fall. By comparison the gini coefficient for India is 
about 0.65 and is about 0.57 for Uttar Pradesh, the neighbouring state in the plains. Wealth 
inequality is still lower than these numbers suggest, of course, since agriculture is less productive in 
the hills. The low inequality is reflected in the fact that there are very few landless households in 
hill villages, and in higher rural literacy rates which in 1991 were above 45% as opposed to about 
36% for India and 30% for Uttar Pradesh. 
 
Caste heterogeneity is also lower than in the rest of India, with the index of caste 
heterogeneity at about 0.67 for the three hill districts being considerably lower than the mean for 
India or Uttar Pradesh, which are about 0.86. (These numbers are higher at the district than the 
village level, due to the definition of the index. See Tables 1 and 2.) The largest castes are Brahmins 
and Thakurs or Kshatriyas as they are sometimes called, with Scheduled Castes being a minority. 
Most villages have no other castes. 
 
Estimation and Results 
 
The effects of heterogeneity of a village in landholding and caste composition on 
collective action can be evaluated using different indicators of collective action. Some of these are 
direct measures of collective action, such as the hiring of watchmen or the annual frequency of 
meetings of the Panchayat. However, the efficacy of collective action ultimately depends on the net 
benefits from the forest.  
 
These are of two kinds: benefits from the stock, and benefits from harvest flows. The 
most important direct benefit from the stock is water conservation. The forest reduces runoff during 
the monsoon and enables percolation of rainwater into the rock, essential for maintaining flows in 
springs. Water shortages are acute in many villages in the region, so the villagers see this as an 
important issue.  
 
We have no data on benefits from harvest flows, but we believe that these are increasing 
in the stock, which we measure. There are two reasons to believe that villagers prefer to maintain 
 
6 Based on agricultural statistics from various states. Data sources for this and the following paragraph are derived from 
the 1931 and 1991 censuses and were provided by Rohini Somanathan. 
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high stocks if they can achieve the necessary collective action. First, privately owned trees and 
groves tend to be well-maintained and lopped for fodder and wood on a sustainable basis. If 
villagers were liquidity constrained and had high discount rates that rendered it optimal for them to 
disinvest in the forest stock, this would not be observed. Second, interviews with villagers in the 





The data on village-level variables were obtained from village surveys conducted in 1998 
and 1999. Information on the caste composition of households, the maximum and minimum 
landholding, the numbers of households with various amenities such as cooking gas and  kerosene 
stoves were obtained along with some information on other village-level variables and information 
about the functioning of the Van Panchayat, if any. 
 
The sample villages were selected by a random choice of thirteen 1:25000 topographic maps 
from those available in the districts with significant numbers of Van Panchayats. The first 10 of 
these that contained villages were selected and one was dropped owing to lack of time to survey it. 
Each valley (as we will refer to the areas from the maps) contains about 10-15 villages that were 
surveyed. In each village the Sarpanch or one of the other panches were surveyed. The information 
was checked by interviewing one or two other residents.  
 
The data on the density of forest cover in each plot of land is derived from satellite images. 
Since the quality of these images for earlier periods is poor, it was feasible to obtain reliable data on 
a large scale only for a recent year, 1998.   
 
Other important variables, constructed from maps and census data include: the mean distance of the 
Panchayat forest from the nearest habitation, local population density, and availability of other 
forest nearby that serves as a substitute, and ecological variables such as the mean aspect, altitude, 
and slope. 
 
The data are examined separately for broadleaved and pine forests. The measure of the stock 
that is used is the estimated proportion of the area covered by tree crowns. For the species in 
question, crown cover is known to be highly correlated with other measures of the forest stock such 
as bole biomass, total above-ground biomass, and basal cover (Tiwari and Singh, 1984, 1987). 
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Crown cover is obtained from interpretation of an IRS-1D LISS-3 image from May 31 1998, 
covering an area of about 20,000 square kilometers. Details of the image interpretation procedures 
are given in Prabhakar, Somanathan, and Mehta (2001), so only a brief account is provided here. 
Information collected on the ground was used as an input to classify the image into broadleaved 
forest (including scrub), pine forest, and other categories (mainly grasslands and agriculture). 
Crown cover was visually measured in a sample of plots using a grid placed over an April 24, 2000, 
1-meter resolution Ikonos satellite image. The IRS-1D Liss-3 image was used to compute various 
band ratios and the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI). Regression of these measures 
on a logistic transform of crown cover in the sample revealed that the NDVI and the ratio of bands 
2 to 5 were most closely correlated with crown cover in broadleaved and pine forests respectively. 
So the NDVI and the band ratio 2/5 were used to predict crown cover in our data.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 describe the data. 
 




Area  Area in hectares  
CCbl  Mean proportion of area covered by tree crowns in Broadleaved part of forest (1998) 
Ccpine  Mean proportion of area covered by tree crowns in pine part of forest (1998) 
Propbl  Proportion of forest that is broadleaved forest or scrub (1998) 
Proppine  Proportion of forest that is pine forest (1998) 
Aspect  Proportion of area that is north-facing 
Altitude  Altitude in kilometers 
Altsq   Square of altitude 
Popdensity  Population density, persons/sq km. 
Roaddist  Round-trip time in hours from nearest road 
Nbl  Area covered by broadleaved tree crowns in polygons with centroids within 4 hour round trip 
time of polygon centroid
7 
Npi  Area covered by pine tree crowns in polygons with centroids within 4 hour round trip time of 
centroid 
                                                 
7 Data for forest cover and other geographic variables were obtained for polygons, with the union of one or more 
polygons comprising a Panchayat forest, Reserved Forest compartment, etc. 
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sh_lpg  Share of households with LPG (cooking gas) in village 
sh_kero  Share of households using kerosene in village 
land_equal  Ratio of minimum to maximum landholding in village 
caste_heter  1 - (sum of squares of shares of households of each caste) 
tot_hh  Total number of households in village 
sh_wopanch  Share of women in the Van Panchayat 
Watch Dummy  for  watchman  in Van Panchayat forest 
bank_bal  Van Panchayat's bank balance in rupees  
Panch_meet  Number of Van Panchayat meetings per year 
Fine  Dummy for whether Van Panchayat levies fines 
open_day  Number of days Panchayat forest is open in a year for any use 
tot_lstock  Total livestock in village 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable |  Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max 
        
Area    |  65  187.6492 518.2693 1.5586  3977.997 
Propbl  |  65  .6563196 .2459338 .0364924 1 
Proppine  |  64  .2629923 .2717436 0  .9633344 
CCbl  |  65  .5519873 .2911366 .0497542 .9901401 
CCpine  |  60  .3524733 .3071703 .0055805 .9991623 
Aspect  |  65  .4758215 .3471274 0  1 
Altitude  |  65  1.578867 .3754071 .8209676 2.641732 
Altsq  |  65  2.639199 1.273442 .6739878 6.978746 
habdist  |  65  .8272339 .4380927 .2492761 2.416653 
Popdensity  |  65  190.6974 142.9035 15.21957 807.4767 
Roaddist  |  65  1.729002 1.7786  .0936674 6.823395 
Nbl    |  65  471.772  363.8833 1.256366 1551.407 
Npi    |  65  112.5675 119.8815 0  376.6362 
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sh_lpg  |  62  .1034808 .1805171 0  1 
sh_kero  |  62  .2182615 .2419309 0  1 
land_equal  |  63  .1272421 .1294285 0  .9090909 
caste_heter  |  53  .3496799 .2385456 0  .7443225 
tot_hh |  63 86.31746  73.484  7  286 
sh_wopanch  |  45  .1844295 .2191394 0  1 
Watch  |  47  .7021277 .4622673 0  1 
bank_bal  |  48  8756.604 31934.12 0  206090 
Panch_meet  |  46  5.630435 3.548763 0  12 
fine    |  45  .4444444 .5025189 0  1 
open_day  |  42  282.2143 92.18818 182  365 
tot_lstock  |  50 682.34  794.6712  60 3500 
 
The effects of inequality and caste heterogeneity on collective action are presented in 
regressions reported in Table 3. The first column reports marginal effects evaluated at the means 
from a logit regression of the watchman dummy variable. Neither land equality nor caste 
heterogeneity has an effect on the probability of hiring a watchman that is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. Nor is there any measurable gender effect captured by the variable “sh_wopanch” 
which is the share of women in the panchayat. The regression reported does not include several 
potential controls. Any variable which affects the value of the forest could affect the choice of 
whether or not to hire a watchman. Such variables include ecological variables such as the 
proportion of the forest that is broadleaved, the aspect, as well as variables which affect the demand 
for forest products and the cost of harvesting. Inclusion of these controls, however, does not affect 
the result. 
 
The second column reports a linear regression of the log of the annual frequency of 
panchayat meetings in the year preceding the survey on the variables of interest with the same 
controls. A 10-percentage point increase in land equality raises the frequency of panchayat meetings 
by 16 percent. This effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. Caste heterogeneity has a 
positive and insignificant effect. The inclusion of the controls listed in Table 1 does not weaken the 
result, with the coefficient increasing to 2 although significant only at the 12% level. However, the 
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land equality coefficient, though positive, is not significant in regressions with valley dummies. It 
could be that this is simply on account of reduced variance in the explanatory variables together 
with an increase in the effects of measurement error.  
 
Table 3: Effects of Heterogeneity on Collective Action 
 







0.5786189*   
(0.3287293)   




-0.0491123   
(0.1850669) 
0.0329509   
(0.2401794)    












0.0426438   
(0.0470941) 
-0.0095995   





-0.0208291   
(0.2006364) 
-0.1260322   
(0.1597859) 
Nbl     0.0001476 
(0.0001091) 
 
Constant   -0.80 
(1.29) 
  0.2787736   
(0.2563678) 
Wald chisq (5)  11.38**       
F(5,38)   2.42*     
R
2   0.26  0.16  0.09 
Observations 44  44  53  48 
 
Note: One, two, and three *’s indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
The results on direct indicators of collective action are mixed, with no effect of caste 
heterogeneity on either the frequency of meetings or the presence of a watchman, while there is 
some evidence that land equality affects the former positively, but not the latter.  
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Turning to the effects on outcomes, we consider broadleaved forests first. The third column 
of Table 3 reports a linear regression of crown cover in broadleaved parts of Panchayat forests with 
valley fixed effects and instruments for the neighboring stock of forests. These instruments are the 




Neither land equality, nor caste heterogeneity have a statistically significant effect. The 
signs are the opposite of those in the previous regressions. The share of woman panches (not 
included in the regression reported here), also has no measurable effect. 
 
This is a reduced form for a model in which the underlying exogenous variables measuring 
heterogeneity affect the frequency of meetings and the hiring of a watchman, which in turn affect 
the quality of the forest. But the difficulty in estimating the model directly is that no instruments 
were available for the watchman and frequency of meetings. Any variable that affects these is likely 
also to affect the value of the forest, and its quality directly. 
 
The last column of Table 3 reports a linear regression of crown cover in the pine parts of the 
Panchayat forests on the explanatory variables. The coefficient on land equality, significant at the 
10% level, is 0.56, meaning that a 10 percentage point increase in land equality raises crown cover 
by 5.6 percentage points. Including controls with or without valley fixed effects, tends to increase 
the precision of the estimate, which fails to be significant at the 10% level only for the same 
specification with valley fixed effects. Nevertheless, the coefficient is always positive across 
specifications, ranging from 0.39 up to 0.69. The other coefficients of interest, on caste 
heterogeneity, and the share of women in the Panchayat are not significant, as before. 
 
To summarize, there is no evidence to show that caste heterogeneity or the share of women 
in the Panchayat has an effect on collective action to manage the forests. The effect of land equality 
is less clear. On the one hand, there is the evidence for the positive effect of land equality on the 
frequency of Panchayat meetings and on crown cover in pine forests. On the other hand, there is no 
effect on the probability of a watchman being hired. Nor is there any effect on broadleaved forest 
cover. As pointed out earlier, villagers generally have a greater interest in the preservation of 
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Contrary to much speculation on the role of caste in collective action, no correlation 
between caste heterogeneity and indicators of collective action or forest cover was found. There is 
some evidence to indicate a link between land equality and one of the indicators of collective action 
as well as between land equality and forest cover in pine forests. However, the absence of any link 
between land equality and forest cover in broadleaved forests and the other indicator of collective 
action makes it difficult to interpret this finding. The crude measure of inequality that we possess 
may also obscure relations which do exist. 
 
As pointed out in the introduction, the community forest setting examined in this paper 
offers a test of whether heterogeneity of different kinds hinders collective action in a very direct 
way, making it harder for agreements to be reached. The main finding is that, at least in this region, 
there is no evidence that ethnic heterogeneity hinders collective action. There is some evidence that 
land inequality may hinder collective action. No gender effect on collective action was found. These 
results are in contrast to those found at larger levels of aggregation or in different contexts by 
various scholars. This may be because collective action in the context of village forestry may not 
face the hurdles that it does in other situations where collective action has to mediated by political 
processes or involves choices about the types of public goods to be provided. It could also be, of 
course, particular to the region studied, perhaps because inequality and ethnic divisions are not as  
pronounced and, therefore, variable, in comparison to other areas.  
 
References 
Agrawal, Arun, and Yadama, Gautam N. (1997). "How do Local Institutions Mediate Market and 
Population Pressures on Resources? Forest Panchayats in Kumaun, India." Development and 
Change, 28: 435-465. 
 
Aggarwal, Chetan (1996). "Boundary and Property Rights in Uttarakhand Forests." Wasteland 
News, Feb-March 1996. 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly (1999). “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4): 1243-84.  
 
Anon. (1984). Van Panchayaton Ki Karya Pranali Ka Moolyankan Adhyayan. Government of Uttar 
Pradesh, Lucknow. 
 
Ballabh, Vishwa, and Katar Singh (1988). "Van (Forest) Panchayats in the Uttar Pradesh Hills: A 
critical analysis". Research Paper, Institute of Rural Management, Anand. 
 
12Page 12 from 13    
   
Bardhan, Pranab, and Jeff Dayton-Johnson (2001). “Inequality and the governance of water 
resources in Mexico and South India.” Mimeo, UC Berkeley. 
 
Prabhakar, R., E. Somanathan and Bhupendra Singh Mehta (2001). "How Degraded are Himalayan 
Forests?" URL: http://www.isid.ac.in/~som/#WP 
 
Raju, Manju S. (1997). "Seeking Niches in Forest Canopy: An enquiry into women's participation". 
Mimeo, Institute of Rural Management, Anand. 
 
Saxena, N.C. (1987). "Commons, Trees and the Poor in the Uttar Pradesh Hills". Network Paper 5f, 
Social forestry network, Overseas development Institute. London. 
 
___________ (1995). "Towards Sustainable Forestry in the U.P. Hills." Centre for Sustainable 
Development, Lal Bahadur Sastri National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie. 
 
Singh, Satyajit (1998). "Collective Dilemmas and Collective Pursuits: Community Management of 
van panchayats (forest councils) in the UP Hills", mimeo, University of Sussex. 
 
Somanathan, E. (1991). "Deforestation, Property Rights and Incentives in Central Himalayas." 
Economic and Political Weekly 26:PE37-46. 
 
__________, R. Prabhakar, and Bhupendra Singh Mehta (2002). "Community vs. State 
Management: Forest Quality in the Indian Central Himalayas", mimeo, Indian Statistical Institute, 
Delhi. 
 
Tiwari, A.K., and J.S. Singh (1984). "Mapping Forest Biomass in India through Aerial Photographs 
and non-destructive field sampling." Applied Geography 4: 151-165. 
 
_____________(1987). ``Analysis of Forest Land-use and Vegetation in a Part of Central 
Himalaya, Using Aerial Photographs.'' Environmental Conservation, 14(3): 233-244. 
 
Vasan, Sudha. (2001). "Ethnography of the Forest Guard: Contrasting Discourses, Conflicting 
Roles and Policy Implementation." Paper presented at the Workshop "Rethinking 
Environmentalism", Dept. of Sociology, Delhi School of Economics, December 6, 2001. 
 
 
13Page 13 from 13 